Freedom of expression is not freedom from criticism – a response to the UNSRVAWG

The conflict of human rights is not a new idea. Rather, discourses about the delicate balance which must be struck between the limitation of one right and the protection of another are as old as the notion of human rights itself; the right to swing one’s fist, it’s said, ending just in front of another’s face. Except in very few cases, such as the protection of life or freedom from enslavement, human rights are ‘qualified’ – that is to say, they come with conditions and responsibilites. This leaves them open to debate and to contestation as to where exactly the limits of the right lie.

Freedom of expression is one such contested right. A qualified right under regional and international human rights law, it is allowed to be limited for the sake of “the rights or reputations of others… the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals” (Article 19, ICCPR) and “in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” (Article 10, ECHR).

The idea of restriction of free expression for the protection of the rights of others, therefore, is not a new one either. Indeed, it is canonical in international human rights law.

Which brings me to the reason for this post. On 22nd May 2023, the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women and Girls (UNSRVAWG), Reem Alsalem, published a statement in which she decries “the escalation of intimidation and threats against women and girls for expressing their opinions and beliefs regarding their needs and rights based on their sex and/or sexual orientation.” (Alsalem, 1) What the SR is referencing here is the pushback against so-called “gender critical” views, which range from denial of the rights of trans people to be treated socially as their affirmed gender, to the “reduction” of the trans population (which has been compared to genocidal rhetoric).

“Gender critical,” which I surround with quotation marks, is therefore a polite way of saying “transphobic,” something which many adherents to the philosophy vehemently deny while continuing to act in transphobic ways. I prefer, and will continue, to use the terms “anti-gender/anti-trans views/actors,” as I believe they are more accurate. Likewise, what we agree to call something gives life to that thing, and accepting the terms on which another defines their views gives legitimacy to those terms. I do not accept “gender critical,” therefore, nor do I accept that anti-gender views can be summed up as referring only to the needs and rights of cisgender women and girls.

The rights of women and girls – all women, trans and cis – are vital. This is not up for debate. However, when the SR refers to women and girls, she is referring to “women born female,” or cisgender women and girls. She is concerned with the right to expression of women who wish to “emphasize the specific needs of women born female and who call for and engage in discussions around the definitions of sex gender, and gender identity and the interaction of rights derived from these for rights holders in any given society.” (Alsalem, 2)

It is not debated that the right to expression of those who hold anti-gender views exists. Society includes persons with many views which we may find repugnant. However, when the expression of those views impacts on the rights and dignity of others in society, the qualification of the right becomes important.

The political climate around gender identity and gender diversity is highly toxic. Opposition to trans rights continues to climb both at social and political levels. The UN Independent Expert on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity last week produced an end-of-mission report on the United Kingdom which stated that “civil society and public officials informed the Independent Expert that… abusive rhetoric by politicians is trickling down and facilitating increasingly abusive and hateful speech in the social media, which in turn seems to be spurring rapid increases in the frequency of bias-motivated incidents of harassment, threats, and violence, including rampant surges in hate crimes.” (Madrigal-Borloz, 25). This social media rhetoric is visible to anyone who is a regular user of Twitter, where any trans-positive statement from individuals, media, or political figures, is almost always swamped by transphobic replies. Equally, and particularly in the UK, it is regurgitated in the print media, where columns in leading newspapers frequently decry the inclusion of trans people in sports and social areas such as women’s bathrooms.

Alsalem chooses to couch this political, contentious, and even violent speech in the language of “rais[ing] concerns regarding the scope of rights based on gender identity and sex” (Alsalem, 2). This implies a civil debate on a contestable topic, not – as the reality shows – the questioning of the rights of a vulnerable social minority. As O’Thomson has written, “‘Let Women Speak’ [a well-known anti-trans series of rallies and a gathering twitter hashtag for anti-trans advocates] claims to be centred on women’s rights. In reality, the ‘women’s issues’ they focus on do not concern the right to reproductive justice, freedom from domestic violence, or period poverty – they are unified around a vilification of trans people, and our right to exist peacefully in civil society.”

So too with the UNSR’s statement, which focuses only on the rights of cis women to question the inclusion of trans women in women’s spaces. The UNSR, who has previously stated that lesbians need “a life where they can to enjoy [sic] single sex social spaces and where this aspect of their identity based on their #sexualorientation is respected and protected,” and that she “do[es] not share [other UN experts’] position that there is a human right to acquire a gender identity through unregulated self-identification,” is clearly indicating support for anti-gender rhetoric in her statement.

As the UNSR herself admits, this is not a position shared by her colleagues at the United Nations. From the Human Rights Committee to the other Special Rapporteurs, there is a consensus on the rights and freedoms of trans persons to live in their affirmed gender and to partake fully in the social life of their country, from obtaining a corrected birth certificate to living free from violence and discrimination. Indeed, the existence of the office of the Independent Expert on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, Victor Madrigal-Borloz, shows that gender identity is considered by the UN as a characteristic worth protecting. Madrigal-Borloz has stated that “[a]nti-gender narratives defend a world of absolutes that must be challenged if human rights are to be enjoyed universally.”

I therefore put forward that the kind of speech to which the UNSR is referring is neither harmless nor uncontested, nor can it be seen as purely a defence of the rights of cis women and girls.

The logical and legal fallacies in the UNSR’s statement themselves deserve some attention. For example, she states that “Whereas counter-protesters also have the right to freedom of expression and assembly, law enforcement must ensure that this is not exercised in a manner that prevents women from exercising their rights to freedom of assembly and speech, whether through threats, intimidation, or use of violence, where women’s speech is effectively silenced by loud counter-protests. There is a positive legal obligation to protect women in such circumstances, including by keeping counter-protesters at a distance that is safe, and enables women’s speech to be audible.” (Alsalem, 1)

There is a human right to freedom of assembly, and to bodily integrity and safety. There is no legal human right to a certain decibel range, nor to audibility.

The UNSR is also concerned with the ‘silencing’ of anti-trans actors, whom she notes with concern are sometimes called ““Nazis,” “genocidaires” and “extremists”.” (Alsalem, 1) Aside from the notion that correctly labelling extremist views is something which a human rights expert disagrees with, I find it strange that the UNSR correlates the labelling of extremist views with “inciting violence and hatred.” She states that “According to international human rights law, freedom of expression should be protected unless it incites violence and hatred.” I do not disagree on that, but I disagree strongly on where the bar is set. For this author, questioning the level of human rights to be afforded to a marginalised population is far more likely to incite violence and hatred than labelling one’s political beliefs in a manner with which one disagrees. If that is the standard, then the bar is on the floor and name-calling becomes antithetical to international human rights law.

Lastly, I wish to take issue with the UNSR’s rejection of potential consequences for anti-trans speech, in which she includes “censorship, legal harassment, loss of jobs, loss of income, removal from social media platforms, speaking engagements and the refusal to publish research conclusions and articles.” (Alsalem, 2) Firstly, these are mostly actions taken by private organisations, which are allowed to set terms of service which set standards for the kind of speech they allow. Secondly, the UNSR states that “any restriction on freedom of expression should be carried out strictly in accordance with the human rights standards of legality, necessity, proportionality and to serve a legitimate aim.” I am not in dialogue with the UNSR, but if I were, I would invite her to consider why limiting the reach of those who advocate for the ‘questioning’ or criticism of the human rights of a marginalised population is not a proportional and legitimate aim.

Freedom of expression is a human right. But human rights carry responsibilities. If they are to be used in a manner against the social good, they can be qualified by states. Likewise, if someone uses their freedom of expression to endanger the human rights of others to be free from discrimination and violence, they may face social consequences or the rejection of their views. When the UNSR advocates for the voices of those who espouse “gender critical” or anti-gender views around the supposed ‘sex-based rights’ of cis women, she is utilising her freedom of expression in a manner with which many will disagree.


Dr Sandra Duffy is a lecturer in law, specialising in international human rights – a subject in which she holds a PhD in gender and rights. She is frequently asked by those who disapprove of her to name the people who let an idiot like her teach law, to which she replies that it was several top universities at last count, but that her views are individual and do not represent those employers. She does not read the comments on Twitter.

Gender Identity at the United Nations

My most recent research project has involved compiling a report on gender identity and gender recognition in the Reports, Comments, and Concluding Observations of the United Nations Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures. The findings have had mixed success: in recent years the UN bodies have been more receptive to matters concerning sexual orientation and gender identity issues; however, explicit reference to gender recognition law or gender identity as distinct from the catch-all title of ‘LGBT persons’ are still uncommon.

My research uses the term ‘gender-variant/variance’ to address all non-cisgender persons, including under this remit transgender, transsexual, non-binary, and intersex persons. In doing so I also hope to avoid the imposition of Western terms on persons from cultures which do not have a direct equivalent of our ‘transgender’. Finally, in some countries – such as India, one of the jurisdictions I will be researching for my thesis – there is no clear boundary between sexual orientation and gender identity as it is widely considered that homosexual acts or desires constitute in themselves a form of gender variance. In a project which seeks to challenge the normative functions of legal gender, avoidance of over-categorisation is important.

In legal scholarship, gender identity is often mentioned in the same breath as sexual orientation, despite presenting some very different challenges to the law of human rights; this report acknowledges instances in which a general ‘gender and sexuality minorities’ category is used, while attempting to draw forward true instances of consideration of gender identity and gender expression issues. Instances in which the institutions acknowledge queer and intersex identities are highlighted as marks of progress in inclusion – however, in many cases they are omitted within the reports and observations emerging from the UN.

As McGill’s history of sexual orientation and gender identity before the UN ([2014] 3 Can. J. Hum. Rts. 1) shows, the first time gender identity was explicitly mentioned in UN proceedings was in 2006, with the Joint Statement on Human Rights Violations based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity before the Human Rights Council. The General Assembly followed in 2008 with the adoption by the UN General Assembly of the Statement on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. This resolution, while non-binding, marked the first acknowledgement by the General Assembly of the human rights of sexuality- and gender-based minorities.

2008 is also the point of departure for many of the UN institutions in acknowledging gender identity as a factor in discrimination and persecution of minorities and individuals. The adoption of the General Assembly resolution, along with the signing of the (non-UN, but influential) Yogyakarta Principles in 2007, brought both sexual orientation and gender identity to the fore and led to attention from both States Parties and Treaty Bodies/Special Procedures. In the years between 2008 and 2016, the jurisprudence of the Treaty Bodies has seen a continuing upward trend in references to LGBT/SOGI issues. However, transgender and gender-variant persons, as well as intersex persons, are still often sidelined by the institutions, which in many cases tend to consider as analogous homophobic discrimination and SOGI-based discrimination.

The opinions of Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures recorded in my report are not entirely based in legislative proposals – although some are made – but rather, they show the frequency of discrimination and persecution that occurs when transgender persons are marginalised and illegitimised. As an argument for the importance of gender recognition law, therefore, they show the necessity of decriminalising, addressing, and including gender-diverse identities into the scheme of international human rights law.

The Committees which engage the most with gender identity issues are the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR), and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). These are not surprising findings – where international law meets gender variance, in the main, involves legal recognition (a civil/political right); access to healthcare (a socioeconomic right); and discrimination on the basis of gender. While it is true that almost all gender-variant individuals will encounter discrimination on the basis of their gender identity/expression in some situations, CEDAW concerns itself greatly with the dangers of sexual and other violence suffered by transgender women who are often attacked in situations like enforced confinement in men’s prisons.

General Comment 22 of the CESCR, on the right to sexual and reproductive health and published earlier this month, explicitly recognises the need for recognition of gender-variant persons, stating:

For the purpose of this General Comment, references to LGBTI persons include, in addition to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons, other persons who face violations of their rights on the basis of their actual or perceived sexual orientation, gender identity and sex characteristics, including those who may identify with other terms.

This is the most explicit statement of recognition and personhood of all queer and gender-variant identities to be found in the UN’s collective output on the subject so far. The addition of intersex to the protected designation ‘LGBT’ shows a willingness to promote the welfare of those with non-standard sexual characteristics, who may identify within the binary or otherwise. It is to be hoped that the UN will continue to include a broader range of physical and personal identities in their statements, and in contexts other than healthcare. While it is undeniable that healthcare is an area which disproportionately engages gender-variant persons, addressing these persons mainly through the lens of healthcare does continue to associate gender variance with pathologisation. A statement on the civil/political right of such persons to legal gender recognition would be welcome.

The countries most targeted for recommendations by the UN Committees are the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, all of which operate restrictive laws around freedom of expression and assembly of queer and gender-variant persons (“propaganda laws”). The Committees find it concerning that these laws, ostensibly for the protection of children from immoral factors, are used instead to stigmatise and criminalise queer and gender-variant persons who attempt to speak or associate freely. Ukraine also comes under heavy criticism (CCPR/C/UKR/CO/7, paragraph 10) for its treatment of persons seeking medical help in gender transition as psychiatric patients with a compulsory confinement to a psychiatric hospital for up to 45 days, as well as mandatory surgery. The Committees also remark on the criminalisation of transgender identities in the Gulf states such as Iran and Kuwait.

With regard to the Special Procedures, the Rapporteurs who concern themselves most with gender and sexuality-based minorities are the Special Rapporteurs on Health, on Human Rights Defenders, on Violence Against Women, and on Extrajudicial, Arbitrary, or Summary Executions. The latter two are the unfortunate consequence of the violence suffered by many gender-variant persons, particularly transgender women or female-presenting persons – in particular in Guatemala, Mexico, and Turkey.

The Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders has been a consistent voice against the adversity experienced by defenders working with gender- and sexuality-based minorities since 2002 (E/CN.4/2002/106/Add.2 – the earliest statement on ‘LGBT’ persons I located in the UN reports). The mandate’s reports have been consistent in addressing ‘sexual orientation and gender identity’ or ‘LGBTI’ issues in the intervening years. This attention illustrates the difficulties of working for causes such as gender recognition, which face cultural barriers in many parts of the world.

The Special Rapporteur on Health has, unsurprisingly, been one of the main promoters of the rights of gender- and sexuality-based minorities, beginning in 2004 (E/CN.4/2004/49) with a statement on discrimination against “many people with lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender identities or conduct” – quite a progressive statement, including gender expression (“conduct”) as well as identity. The mandate has also stated its opposition to medical intervention on children born intersex, on the basis of bodily autonomy. Its statement regarding intersex persons in childhood development (A/70/213) also included recognition that

Deeply rooted stereotypes around gender dichotomy and medical norms about male and female bodies have led to the establishment of a medical practice of routine interventions and surgeries on intersex people, including irreversible genital surgery and sterilization.

This strong statement on bodily autonomy and sex characteristics shows a willingness to engage with the most sidelined minorities in this area, and is a promising development for UN output and practice.

While much of the UN’s engagement with gender identity issues is not strictly based on the kind of legal recognition which is the basis of my research thesis, the knowledge base gained from seeing how international human rights institutions engage with gender-variant identities and expressions allows for a better understanding of the norms, cultural and regulatory, involved in human rights law in this area. As my research involves consideration of how domestic legal systems tackle issues around gender recognition, it necessarily requires a basis in the dominant discourse of international human rights law. I will continue to survey these institutions in the next stage of my research, exploring gender identity and recognition before the regional human rights systems (in particular, the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights).